A note from Morgan:
“This must-read piece was written by David Copley, who served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Iraq Affairs in the Trump Administration. Prior to his service in the White House, David served as an intelligence officer for the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), where he focused on Middle East issues and counterterrorism. David deployed to Iraq twice during his time at DIA in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Deterrence is the cornerstone to American national security- it keeps Americans safe, our allies close, and our enemies at bay. I hope you take the time to read David’s analysis of the deterrence lessons learned during the Trump Administration.”
U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria have been attacked more than 100 times since October by Iran-aligned militias. Our U.S. Navy warships have been forced to intercept dozens of missiles and drones in the past few weeks. Global trade through the Red Sea has been disrupted. One American servicemember has already been critically injured as a result of these attacks; others have been wounded. Despite these provocations, the U.S. response has been limited at best, consisting primarily of public calls for de-escalation and a few small-scale airstrikes against Iran-linked militants in Iraq and Syria.
As the Trump Administration’s State Department advisor for Iraq policy in the period shortly after the strike on Qassem Soleimani, my team and I spent countless hours thinking about deterring Iran and its associated militias. It is by no means an easy task, but I’ve laid out seven lessons I hope the current Administration learns from past experience, rather than re-learns the hard way through their own trial-and-error.
1. Inaction is an action, and inaction often leads to escalation. The Middle East tends to operate using widely understood but publicly unacknowledged “rules of the game” that are established over time through precedent. In the current round of fighting, allowing Iran-aligned militias to shoot hugely destructive ballistic missiles and cruise missiles at U.S. troops without a meaningful response is setting new and deeply unfavorable rules of the game that will be difficult for a future Administration to reverse. And perhaps most importantly, all it takes is one failure by our air defense systems to trigger a mass casualty event that will force the U.S. into a major military confrontation.
2. “Manufactured ignorance” is risky. While it’s historically been convenient for Western policymakers to debate whether attacks by the Iraqi Population Mobilization Forces, Lebanese Hezbollah, Yemen’s Houthis, and various Syrian militias are uncoordinated, the reality is that all these groups rely on Iran for spiritual guidance, strategic leadership, training, and financial support. Major decisions that could pose a risk to Iranian interests are unlikely to be made without coordination. Allowing Iran to hide behind these groups has allowed the Iranians to move up the escalatory ladder while minimizing their own risk.
3. To deter, costs must be imposed. This does not always mean military action, but it does mean there must be tangible consequences for bad behavior, which could include economic sanctions or inclusion on various designation lists via State Department or Treasury authorities. During the Trump Administration, the President’s “Maximum Pressure” campaign relied overwhelmingly on non-military tools to create leverage against Iran’s malign behavior.
4. The most important tool of American foreign policy in the Middle East is our military. This does not mean we should be cavalier about the use of force. But it does mean our enemies need to believe our leaders – and those who advise them - are willing to use deadly force if necessary to protect our people and our interests. President Trump made it abundantly clear to the Iranians he would protect our people when he ordered airstrikes that killed dozens of Iraqi militiamen in response to the death of a single American contractor at K-1 Air Base. He strongly reinforced this perception through his subsequent strike on Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.
5. Target things Iran values. The historic, “go-to” American response of Joint Direct Attack Munition strikes against militants in Iraq and Syria has proven not to deter or change Iranian behavior. Proxies are by nature expendable. And particularly in Iraq, airstrikes make our diplomacy harder, as Iran-aligned political parties opportunistically accuse us of violating Iraq’s sovereignty.
6. Perceptions of weakness undermine our foreign policy in the region. The Middle East is a tough place. Part of the reason countries want to partner with the U.S. is because we have the strongest military in the world and regional leaders directionally want to bet their security alliances on the strongest horses. But our military is only as strong as our leadership is perceived to be tough. Remaining in a defensive crouch for too long risks reinforcing perceptions of American weakness and decline.
7. Be flexible. In business, good leaders pivot when their plans don’t work. Political leaders often have a harder time making similar shifts. If the “good cop” approach to Iran using less pressure and less sanctions enforcement hasn’t worked, it would be a sign of intellectual strength rather than weakness to pivot and choose another course.
The current Administration is faced with tough choices. Americans can appreciate their desire to prevent the U.S. from getting engaged in another costly and protracted Middle Eastern conflict. However, turning the other cheek against ballistic missile attacks, not enforcing sanctions, and repeated public signaling for de-escalation is a riskier path, versus clearly and unequivocally imposing costs on those who shoot at American troops. The Middle East has become an even more dangerous and unstable place over the last few years, and the Biden Team should consider reinstating some of the leverage-oriented policies employed by the Trump Administration as a good starting point in course correction.
David Copley served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Iraq Affairs in the Trump Administration. Previously, he was a Defense Intelligence Agency officer specializing in Iran-aligned militia groups. He is also a U.S. Navy veteran who served in the conflict in Iraq. These views are his own and do not represent the positions of any U.S. Government agency.